Pre-bid Query

RFP No. ONGC/ RFP/ANK/JAMBUSAR/1

Sr. No.	Tender / RFP Clause Reference	Page No.	Existing Clause / Description	Clarification Requested / Justification	Suggested Modification / Change Requested	ONGC'S Reply
1	Clause 6.1 of Auction / Appendix-7 (Pro-forma of BG towards Security Deposit)	Page 42	Security Deposit amount is liable to be forfeited if the bidder fails to participate during the first bid period after submission of all documents.	If a bidder attempts to submit an initial bid or premium during the first bid period, but subsequent aggressive bidding pushes the price beyond their commercial affordability, they are forced to stop bidding. Forfeiture of bid security in this scenario penalizes genuine buyers who are simply priced out by market dynamics. The bid security should only be forfeited if the offered quantity remains completely/partial unsold due to total non-participation by the bidder.	Please modify the clause to explicitly state: **"The bid security / Security Deposit shall not be forfeited if a bidder attempts to participate in the first bid period but ceases to place further bids due to aggressive bidding crossing their commercial affordability. Forfeiture shall only be applicable if the offered quantity remains completely unsold due to total non-participation by the bidder."**	Not Agreed.
2	Article 12 / Schedule B (Price of Natural Gas) & Security Deposit Clauses	Page 23 / 42	Reference to the Applicable Domestic Gas Price (Reserve Price) based on the month of June 2026, and the resulting escalation in the Security Deposit (SD) amount.	The domestic gas price for June 2026 (i.e 10.93 USD/MMBTU) is abnormal and exceptional due to the ongoing West Asia conflict, which has artificially spiked global and domestic energy benchmarks. Benchmarking the Security Deposit (SD) calculation against this temporary, hyper-inflated June 2026 price has resulted in a drastic and unrealistic increase in the required SD amount. Such a prohibitively high SD threshold creates severe cash-flow constraints and will inevitably lead to significantly lower participation from genuine domestic buyers.	1. It is requested that ONGC consider the Applicable Domestic Gas Price (Reserve Price) for **July 2026** (8.73 USD/MMBTU) instead of June 2026 (10.93 USD/MMBTU) to ensure normal market alignment. 2. Please revise and reduce the Security Deposit (SD) calculation baseline to reflect normalized historic prices rather than the conflict-driven June 2026 peak, ensuring wider bidder participation.	Not Agreed.
3	Bid Evaluation / Pricing Parameters (RFP / Schedule B)	-	Minimum initial bid / ticker size details for premium quoting.	A minimum initial bid premium of USD 1.00/MMBTU acts as a steep entry barrier for micro, small, and medium-scale industrial buyers, potentially restricting competitive participation. Lowering the ticker increments allows for optimal price discovery.	1. Please lower the Minimum Initial Bid Premium to **USD 0.10/MMBTU**, in line with other standard domestic gas tenders. 2. Please change the bidding increment from "multiples of USD 0.20/MMBTU" to "multiples of USD 0.10/MMBTU".	Not Agreed.
4	Allocation Logic & Contract Award (RFP)	-	Provisions related to backup allocation or bidder defaults.	If the Highest Bidder (H1) backs out or fails to execute the Gas Supply Agreement (GSA) post-allocation, retendering causes substantial operational delays and loss of gas monetization time for ONGC.	Please incorporate a clause stating that if the Highest Premium Bidder (H1) backs out for any reason, the total allocated quantity should be offered to the second-highest bidder (H2) at the H1 price or as per sequential bidding rules.	Not agreed. Please refer RFP.